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Non-technical Summary 
 
There is an intensive debate among academics as well as policymakers on which of the two 
options of unbundling, either ownership unbundling or non-discriminatory third party access, 
is more appropriate to foster competition and thus achieve efficient market outcomes. 
Whereas non-discriminatory third party access to grids and networks comprises softer forms 
of unbundling as informational, organizational or legal unbundling, ownership unbundling of 
monopolistic bottlenecks from potentially competitive value chain levels represents a much 
stronger approach. On the one hand, a consensus has been reached on the general 
advantageousness of implementing a non-discriminatory third party access regime. On the 
other, economists still disagree on the closely related political measure of ownership 
unbundling. Theoretical arguments concerning this strict form of separation are ambiguous as 
ownership unbundling may involve substantial restructuring costs before reducing prices in 
subsequent competition. The net effect is unclear a priori. In contrast, third party access might 
save restructuring costs but, if ineffective, leave efficiency potentials unexploited. Given these 
theoretical trade-offs an empirical investigation is indispensable in order to clarify whether 
softer measures like legal unbundling or independent transmission system operation are 
sufficient to make efficient operation in potentially competitive segments possible. 
In this article, the relative benefits of both options are investigated in static as well as in 
dynamic models. In prior studies, static approaches have been used to examine the effects of 
the measures on efficiency, prices, and distributional consequences. Market reforms, however, 
often induce slow adaptation processes or even reversal of initial trends after some time. 
Effectiveness of reforms is thus not easily measurable. A prominent example in this context is 
the British restructuring and privatization process. Only after several supplementary reforms 
competition in the wholesale electricity market started to work efficiently (cf. Newbery and 
Pollitt (1997)). Against this background, a dynamic framework which takes such lags into 
account may offer deeper insight.  
For the empirical analysis, the South American continent seems to be a suitable object of 
study, since many countries introduced regulatory reforms during the past two decades, 
following diverse routes. Law giving bodies have often chosen a moderate reform speed so 
that effects can be traced back to separate policy causes. Furthermore, residential and 
industrial customer prices are disposable, which allows comparing more and less price 
sensitive customer groups as well as redistributive tendencies. In particular, negative short 
term effects of ownership unbundling found in static models are approximately cancelled out 
by subsequent positive impacts in the dynamic model. Third party access seems to allow for 
similar benefits while avoiding the (restructuring) costs of ownership unbundling. Previously 
estimated static models thus appear to suffer from either omitted variable biases or 
endogeneity problems of static non-difference models. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Sowohl in der politischen als auch in der akademischen Diskussion besteht weiterhin 
Uneinigkeit über die Frage, ob die eigentumsrechtliche Entflechtung oder der nicht-
diskriminierende Netzzugang geeigneter ist, um Wettbewerb zu intensivieren. Während der 
nicht-diskriminierende Netzzugang weichere Formen der Entflechtung wie die 
informationelle, organisatorische und rechtliche Entflechtung umfasst, stellt die 
eigentumsrechtliche Entflechtung die Extremform dar. Zum einen besteht ein allgemeiner 
Konsens über die generelle Vorteilhaftigkeit des nicht-diskriminierenden Netzzugangs. 
Bezüglich der eigentumsrechtlichen Entflechtung besteht unter Ökonomen hingegen noch 
weitgehend Uneinigkeit. Aus der Theorie abgeleitete Wirkungen sind a priori nicht eindeutig, 
weil Restrukturierungskosten entstehen bevor der intensivere Wettbewerb Preise senken kann. 
Im Gegensatz hierzu können Regime nicht-diskriminierenden Netzzugangs 
Restrukturierungskosten einsparen, aber Effizienzpotentiale unausgeschöpft lassen. Eine 
empirische Untersuchung dieser gegenläufigen Effekte scheint deshalb hilfreich bei der 
Beantwortung der Frage, ob weichere Maßnahmen wie die rechtliche Entflechtung 
ausreichen, um effizientes Verhalten in potentiell wettbewerblichen Bereichen zu 
ermöglichen. 
In diesem Artikel wird die relative Vorteilhaftigkeit der beiden politischen Maßnahmen in 
statischen und dynamischen Modellen untersucht. In vorherigen Studien wurden bereits 
statische Ansätze genutzt, um die Auswirkungen auf Effizienz, Preise und Verteilung zu 
analysieren. Anpassungsprozesse im Nachgang zu Reformen finden jedoch oftmals langsam 
statt oder führen zu gegenteiligen Effekten. Die Effektivität von Reformen ist aus diesem 
Grund oftmals schwer messbar. Ein bekanntes Beispiel für einen solchen Anpassungsprozess 
ist die Restrukturierung des Stromsektors in Großbritannien. Erst nach mehrmaligem 
Nachbessern der Reformen hat ein effizienter Wettbewerb eingesetzt (vgl. Newbery and 
Pollitt (1997)). Vor diesem Hintergrund verspricht die Untersuchung in einem dynamischen 
Modellrahmen mit Lagstruktur weitergehende Einsichten. 
Für die empirische Analyse ist der südamerikanische Kontinent ein geeignetes Studienobjekt. 
Viele südamerikanische Länder haben während der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte Reformen 
durchgeführt und sind dabei verschiedenen Ansätzen gefolgt. Oft wurde eine geringe 
Geschwindigkeit bei der Verabschiedung von Reformen gewählt, sodass einzelne Reformen 
separat analysiert werden können. Weiterhin sind sowohl Haushaltskunden- als auch 
Industriepreise verfügbar. Dies ermöglicht den Vergleich mehr oder weniger preissensitiver 
Kunden sowie die Untersuchung von Verteilungswirkungen. Insbesondere die negativen 
kurzfristigen Wirkungen der eigentumsrechtlichen Entflechtung werden durch die 
anschließenden positiven Auswirkungen ungefähr aufgewogen. Der nicht-diskriminierende 
Netzzugang hingegen erlaubt ähnliche Vorteile, ohne jedoch im gleichen Umfang teure 
Restrukturierungskosten tragen zu müssen. Bisher verwendete statische Modelle scheinen 
deshalb an Verzerrungen aufgrund nicht im Modell enthaltener Variablen oder 
Endogenitätsproblemen statischer, nicht-differenzierter Modelle zu leiden. 
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Abstract 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There is an intensive debate among academics as well as policymakers on which of the two 
options of unbundling, either ownership unbundling or non-discriminatory third party access, 
is more appropriate to foster competition and thus achieve efficient market outcomes. 
Whereas non-discriminatory third party access to grids and networks comprises softer forms 
of unbundling as informational, organizational or legal unbundling, ownership unbundling of 
monopolistic bottlenecks from potentially competitive value chain levels represents a much 
stronger approach. On the one hand, a consensus has been reached on the general 
advantageousness of implementing a non-discriminatory third party access regime. On the 
other, economists still disagree on the closely related political measure of ownership 
unbundling. Theoretical arguments concerning this strict form of separation are ambiguous as 
ownership unbundling may involve substantial restructuring costs before reducing prices in 
subsequent competition. The net effect is unclear a priori. In contrast, third party access might 
save restructuring costs but, if ineffective, leave efficiency potentials unexploited. Given these 
theoretical trade-offs an empirical investigation is indispensable in order to clarify whether 
softer measures like legal unbundling or independent transmission system operation are 
sufficient to make efficient operation in potentially competitive segments possible. 
In this article, the relative benefits of both options are investigated in static as well as in 
dynamic models. In prior studies, static approaches have been used to examine the effects of 
the measures on efficiency, prices, and distributional consequences. Market reforms, however, 
often induce slow adaptation processes or even reversal of initial trends after some time. 
Effectiveness of reforms is thus not easily measurable. A prominent example in this context is 
the British restructuring and privatization process. Only after several supplementary reforms 
competition in the wholesale electricity market started to work efficiently.2 These additional 
measures included for example the sale of capacity or a temporary imposition of price-caps at 
the generation level. Against this background, a dynamic framework which takes such lags 
into account may offer deeper insight. For the empirical analysis, the South American 
continent seems to be a suitable object of study, since many countries introduced regulatory 
reforms during the past two decades, following diverse routes3. Law giving bodies have often 
chosen a moderate reform speed so that effects can be traced back to separate policy causes. 
Furthermore, residential and industrial customer prices are disposable, which allows 
comparing more and less price sensitive customer groups as well as redistributive tendencies.  
The article proceeds as follows: After a short method review over the different commonly 
used approaches to policy evaluation and an overview of literature on regulatory policy 
evaluation in the electricity sector in section 2, the dataset is described in section 3. The 
chosen empirical methods and model specifications are discussed in section 4. Section 5 
comprises regression results and addresses reform impacts on industrial and residential prices 
as well as distributional effects. The last section draws main conclusions and gives an 
outlook. 
 
                                                            
2 Cf. Newbery and Pollitt (1997). 
3 This makes it easier to identify statistically the effects of reforms compared to an analysis of EU countries. In EU countries a large 
proportion of the reforms has been triggered by the EU directives and occurred at similar points in time. Thus it is difficult to separate their 
effects from other simultaneously occurring events, for example macroeconomic downturns. 
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2 Methodological Approaches and Literature review 
 
2.1 Methods  
Several approaches have been applied to analyse the success of political reforms. First, the 
financial performance of companies undergoing certain change can be measured directly. 
Second, productivity changes can be examined employing total factor productivity approaches 
(TFP). Third, frontier methods (FM) are an advancement in reference to TFP measures as 
they permit to distinguish between technical and efficiency change. Lastly, the success of 
reforms can be evaluated using societal cost benefit analysis. The main merits and weaknesses 
of these approaches are briefly evoked in the following in order to provide a framework for 
the assessment of own achievements.4 
The first methodological approach, profitability measurement, does not consider possible 
allocative inefficiencies but just takes financial data to judge the success of policies. TFP and 
FM use input-output ratios to examine efficiency gains. Whereas in theory this allows to 
examine allocative effects of the reform and the analysis of the resulting distributional 
changes, TFP and FM have weaknesses in making historical data comparable. This mainly 
concerns the share of capital costs. Most of the empirical literature tries to circumvent this 
problem by choosing physical proxies for capital costs. These are in most cases weak 
substitutes for (standardized) monetary values and thereby a source of substantial distortion. 
Contrarily, societal cost benefit analysis alleviates most comparability problems coming from 
historical data. This method takes companies with their particular history as given and tries to 
find an appropriate counterfactual to compare it with the actual development after reform. 
However, this requires substantial assumptions as a high degree of uncertainty on the 
counterfactual’s appropriateness exists. These comprise hypotheses on firm behavior, 
including the potential degree of competitive pressure or future asset replacement strategies as 
well as hypotheses on governmental comportment such as taxation policy. It should be 
mentioned that in empirical analysis finding an adequate “counterfactual” in the form of 
comparable companies is also a demanding task. Even if companies are satisfyingly similar 
regarding accounting procedures and data, distortions are still possible. One may cite as 
exemplary the fact that countries often privatize those state owned entities which already 
produce quite efficiently.5 This may cause further distortion leading to a misinterpretation of 
results. 
2.2 Literature on electricity policy reform 
Applied research on electricity sector reforms is quite extensive on some of the policy issues 
discussed in this article and mostly regroups under one of the above described methods. I will 
draw on important work for this article as well as on more recent studies and summarize their 
main conclusions. 
 
 
                                                            
4 For the following discussion cf. for example Coelli et al. (2005). 
5 Cf. Zhang et al. (2008). In a similar way in the aftermath of the restructuring of the British Central Electricity Generating Board, the 
government only sold the more modern nuclear power plants (as British Energy) and kept the elderly ones in public ownership, cf. 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997). 
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Ownership unbundling and third party access 
 
Pollitt (2008) gives a detailed and profound discussion of advantages and drawbacks of 
unbundling. Among the most important drawbacks of ownership unbundling, he finds 
transaction costs at the introduction stage and higher costs of capital due to an increasing risk. 
On the other hand the scope for discrimination against non-integrated rivals reduces, thereby 
promoting competition. Among the other factors, security of supply, synergy effects, and the 
facilitation of privatization rank lower in importance. All of these effects may have positive as 
well as negative impacts, however, usually to different degrees. 
Steiner (2000) empirically analyzes the effects of unbundling6, third party access, and 
privatization on electricity end user prices and different efficiency proxies in 19 OECD 
countries. Results of her examination of reform impacts on end user prices strongly support 
the hypothesis that the introduction of a wholesale market lowers prices, whereas private 
ownership increases electricity prices. Unbundling and third party access were found to have 
no significant influence. This is contrasted by a second regression of a domestic/industrial 
customer price ratio on regulatory variables. Here, unbundling, third party access, and the spot 
market introduction variable were significant. Regarding influences on efficiency, Steiner 
(2000) uses the average capacity utilization rate and reserve margins as proxies. In this 
specification only unbundling and privatization are significant. It should be mentioned that the 
average capacity utilization-proxy can lead to distortion between countries. There is a natural 
difference between those countries which are predestined for technologies such as water and 
wind power with usually low full load hours and those countries with high average capacity 
utilization rates because of a dependence on coal or nuclear technologies. In South America 
most countries have a substantial share of water power, which can rise to a (nearly) 100%-
share for some countries. Under these circumstances weather will have a much greater 
influence than the competitiveness of the market. This makes it difficult to correctly 
incorporate the capacity utilization rate as a proxy for efficiency in an empirical analysis. The 
same problems can arise for the reserve margin proxy. 
Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) re-examine the results Steiner obtained in her study and mirror 
these in an analogous estimation on the basis of a similar, but longer data set. In some cases 
the coefficients’ signs of their regulatory variables contradict the ones of Steiner (2000). 
Effects of spot market introduction and privatization are reverse to the analysis of Steiner 
(2000) – for the former positive and for the latter negative. Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) put 
forward market power as a possible explanation for price increases due to the introduction of 
spot markets. They further show unbundling to have an increasing and third party access to 
have a decreasing impact on end prices. 
Copenhagen Economics (2005) examine diverse electricity and gas sector reforms in a study 
for the DG Internal Market. In a more sophisticated approach Copenhagen Economics first 
conduct a principal component analysis to find the composite variables explaining most of the 
variance. In the following regression analysis they obtain a negative significant influence for 
ownership unbundling on end user prices with regard to electricity. This result is not 
confirmed for their gas market analysis. 
Growitsch and Stronzik (2008) chose a dynamic estimation approach regarding the 
                                                            
6 The unbundling variable regroups all kinds of unbundling from accounting to ownership unbundling. 
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endogenous (price) variable, but dismiss the chance of carrying the analysis further to check 
for the influence of lagged exogenous (reform) variables. The focus of their analysis is the 
possible effects of ownership unbundling on end user prices. They see no significant influence 
of ownership unbundling in this static approach, but liberalization seems to have a price 
decreasing impact. Third party access does not seem to have a significant influence. 
More recent work has been conducted by Nagayama (2007, 2009) and Erdogdu (2011). 
Nagayama (2007) uses a panel of 83 countries and finds various reform variables to differ 
substantially in their impact on prices and to lead to partially unintuitive results. His results 
indicate that unbundling in combination with a regulatory agency may lead to lower prices, 
whereas unbundling alone might not. However, he does not further differentiate his 
unbundling variable, which covers legal and stronger forms of unbundling. Nagayama (2009) 
uses a single reform variable to analyze the impacts of, first, prices on the choice of the 
reform model, and, second, the reform model on price. By the means of a multinomial 
discrete choice model, he shows that prices may have an influence on the choice of the reform 
model. Surprisingly, for some considerable part of his sample, reforms had the tendency to 
increase consumer prices. Erdogdu (2011) investigates a compound unbundling variable. One 
of his main results is that unbundling has a positive effect when investigated separately and 
shows a decreasing influence when modeled as an interaction term with privatization or a 
regulator. He does not separate between ownership and softer forms of unbundling. In 
addition, the introduction of spot markets may have ambiguous effects on price-cost margins. 
For South America a price increasing tendency is found. From differences in impacts of 
regulatory reform activity between developed and developing countries the author concludes 
that successful models are not transferred easily between the two and that respective 
idiosyncrasies have to be taken into account. A recent, but broader contribution by Meyer 
(2012) reviews basic theoretical and some complementary empirical results.7 Empirical 
research so far has mostly considered simultaneous impacts of reforms on market prices in 
energy markets. For example Steiner (2000), Hattori and Tsutsui (2004), and Erdogdu (2011) 
use static approaches. Growitsch and Stronzik investigate the gas market with a lagged 
dependent variable model, but refrain from using distributed lags for reform variables of 
interest in addition. This analysis tries to fill this gap with respect to the analysis of electricity 
reforms, especially ownership unbundling and third party access, in South America. 
A different stream of research on the effects of unbundling uses simulation approaches. 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) conduct a detailed societal cost benefit analysis of the British 
power producer and transmission operator CEGB. The restructuring was closely related to 
other reforms like privatization and market opening. They see high efficiency gains but also 
higher firms’ profits and losses by consumers in the restructuring process. De Nooij and 
Baarsma (2007) especially concentrate on a detailed analysis of costs and determine higher 
costs of an introduction of ownership unbundling than benefits for seven out of nine cases. 
The reference case is legal unbundling and the subject under study the Dutch distribution 
network. Brunekreeft (2008) instead focuses more on competition issues and employs a top-
down analysis framework to German transmission system operators. He draws an opposite 
                                                            
7 For recent theoretical discussions of ownership versus legal or softer forms of unbundling cf. for example Höffler and Kranz (2011a, 
2011b). They use sabotage models to explain the optimality of intermediate steps of unbundling. The other driving force is the increased 
supply with higher integration degrees leading to convexity of the problem. Cf. also Cremer et al. (2006), Mandy and Sappington (2007), 
Reitzes (2008). 
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conclusion and sees a small net benefit in switching from legal or functional to ownership 
unbundling. 
There are also single-country studies, one of which is by Nillesen and Pollitt (2008) on New-
Zealand. Amongst others they support the conjecture of high transaction costs at the 
introduction stage together with decreasing unit operational costs. During the last years a lot 
of country case studies were published deepening the understanding and making an in-depth 
understanding of specific influences possible, which cannot be unveiled by statistical analysis 
employing typically crude proxies. Among these we find studies on prominent countries such 
as Argentina and Chile, but also Ecuador and many others.8 The tenor of these studies in most 
cases is in favor of divestiture of public firms and unbundling with a certain uncertainty of 
whether or not ownership unbundling has net benefits. A clearly positive aspect of these 
studies is that they can benefit of authors investigating alternative reasons for the failure of 
reforms, which sometimes are difficult to quantify and to consider in comparative 
econometric analyses. Yet on the other hand, case studies and qualitative analyses obviously 
only provide country-specific insights, no broader statistical evidence.  
Consequently, no clear evidence has been established so far on the effects of ownership 
unbundling vs. softer forms of unbundling and further investigations seem appropriate. 
Especially dynamic impacts depending on these different degrees of unbundling have not 
been analyzed yet.  
 
Further policy reforms 
 
A sort of consensus has by contrast been achieved on the effects of privatization. Megginson 
and Netter (2001) review the historical development, give an extensive overview of 
theoretical and empirical literature on the subject, discuss the pros and cons of privatization, 
characterize different sorts of privatization, and possible sources of efficiency and welfare 
gains of privatization. They conclude that effects of privatization depend very much on the 
political, regulatory, and economic environment. For example, privatization success would 
depend on specific factors like concentration rates (on generation or supply levels), public 
debt, etc. Zhang et al. (2008) have a similar view on privatization effects. They use different 
efficiency indicators to show that the relative importance of privatization is low relative to 
working competition. The analysis though is restricted to the generation level. Using frontier 
methods Berg et al. (2005) estimate the efficiency of privatized electricity distribution utilities 
in Ukraine showing that privatized utilities are significantly more efficient. Efficiency 
measures have also been used by Estache and Rossi (2005). They compare labour 
productivity of public firms under cost plus regulation to that of privately owned firms under 
rate of return and incentive regulation. They find rate of return regulated firms to be more 
efficient by trend. As expected, private firms under incentive regulation are most efficient. 
Their analyses lead to intuitively plausible results but cannot distinguish privatization from 
regulation effects and the regulatory framework seems to have a higher impact.9 A previous 
                                                            
8 Cf. Pollitt (2008), Pollitt (2004) and Peláez-Samamiego (2007). 
9 By using physical measures for capital costs, shifts of operating to capital expenditure are not detected, but solely improvements in 
labour productivity. In this case companies could replace assets, which influences their cost bases but not their physical asset base. For rate 
of return regulation, this pressure comes from the Averch-Johnson effect and for incentive regulation, under certain circumstances, firms 
will have the incentive to cut short run costs (labour) in non-photo years. As their sample is quite short, this can be problematic. Also, “a 
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study obtaining similar results has already been conducted by Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson 
(1998). A more recent study by Cambini and Rondi (2010) focuses the interplay of regulation 
regimes and investment incentives in electricity distribution networks. They find higher 
incentives to invest for incentive regulation regimes. 
A very broad analysis on privatization, liberalization, unbundling, investment risk and some 
other key factors of reforms has been conducted by Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001). They 
confine themselves more or less to a discussion of these factors and highlight some of the 
difficulties in restructuring and reforming electricity sectors in developing countries. Among 
these are the ambiguous effects of privatization and its dependence on accompanying 
circumstances like market regulation. The authors conclude that only if investors have 
sufficient certainty about future returns will they invest and in turn increase competition. 
Another issue, which has given rise to some debate, is the independence of regulatory bodies. 
Whereas Posner (1975) emphasizes possible negative consequences of rent seeking behavior, 
Becker (1983) argues that interest group competition favors efficient taxation. Campos (1989) 
shows that the choice of the political instrument is important to obtain efficient market 
outcome. Legislators usually maximize own expected median net present value (including 
influence of pressure groups) but not possible maximum social welfare. Consequently, they 
are prone to choose a suboptimal instrument at the first level. This can prohibit welfare 
optimal outcomes at a second stage. In a situation where the choice is between tariff 
regulation either by an independent agency or by a ministry, there seems to be a danger that 
well-organized (and endowed) pressure groups support the choice of the latter instrument. 
They then could uphold their influence on politicians in the ministries on second stage welfare 
distribution, for example in price regulation processes. Independent agencies contrarily should 
be less exposed to current policy and consequently should tend to pursue a once defined 
mandate more rigorously and mitigate second stage influence. Mostly these mandates pursue 
goals of more efficient operation and price decreases to make customers better off and to 
increase welfare. As a consequence, under the hypothesis that legislators are able to define an 
optimal mandate once, independent agencies may lead to decreasing prices. On the other 
hand, evidence supports the impression that agencies are also subject to substantial political 
influence. Empirical literature dealing specifically with electricity regulation is scarce. Zhang 
et al. (2008) report relatively low importance of an independent regulatory agency on efficient 
behaviour of generating companies. Nevertheless, general theory suggests political influence 
on the second stage decision process to be more pronounced in ministries than in separate 
agencies. Under these circumstances decreasing prices (and thereby assumed welfare gains) 
from independent authorities are imaginable, but, as already mentioned, empirical analysis is 
still scarce. 
Under comparable conditions, a systematic impact is also expected from different price 
regulation methods.10 In contrast, evidence from a lot of countries shows that both the choice 
of regulatory asset bases and the definition of hard external price targets are often determined 
by political awareness and pressure, and rather independent of the form of price regulation. 
This can also lead to low (and even lower) prices in cost based regimes when  compared to 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
measure of labour productivity gives little indication about efficiency in a capital-intensive sector like electricity.” (Zhang et al. (2008), 
Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001)) 
10 Cf. Estache and Rossi (2005) 
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incentive-based regimes.11 Therefore, the second level instrument ‘price regulation method’ 
may play a less important role than the primary instrument of the political independence of 
the regulatory authority. Nevertheless, it should be noted that both variables are weak 
indicators for the real political processes and pressures. 
Finally, the introduction of electricity exchanges increases the transparency on the wholesale 
level by giving signals on current or future prices. These signals are reliable only if liquidity is 
sufficient. However, the consequences of creating spot and futures markets can exert positive 
as well as negative influences on prices. Increased transparency can make collusion more 
easily exercisable.12 On the other hand, if workable competition is in place, electricity 
exchanges will make coordination of production easier and lead to efficiency gains by 
advanced arbitrage. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables of interest. These are listed including possible – positive or 
negative – main impacts on retail prices. The last column, expected overall impact, mirrors a 
subjective expectation about the impact on prices that shall summarize insights gained 
through empirical evidence and by theoretical reasoning. 
 
Table 1: Expected signs of reform variables in the empirical analysis 
 
 
3 Data and Variable Description 
 
The dataset includes information for nine South American countries over the observation 
                                                            
11 Some examples are the United Kingdom and Poland. The cost based element in UK incentive regulation, p-naught, was stipulated on a 
very low level, so that part of the success of incentive-based regulation originates from the cost-based share (Dewenter and Malatesta 
(1997)). For Poland the following quote from Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) is instructive: “Although the Law [Polish Energy Law] does 
not mention directly the cost of capital, it makes clear that the energy prices are to allow necessary investments and in practice the cost of 
capital will have to be taken into account in setting and approving of energy tariffs.” This led to last year’s discussion between the regulatory 
agency and distribution system operators whether or not cost of capital of old assets can be included into the cost base. The regulatory agency 
wanted to include solely the depreciation share of capital costs. 
12 Cf. again the experience in Britain described in Newbery and Pollitt (1997). 
Reform Variable
Ownership Unbundling
Third Party Access
Reform Controls
Privatization
Independent Regulatory Authority
Control Variables
Country and Year Dummies
GDP per Capita
+ -
dependent on external 
shock/ country specifities
dependent on relation of 
specific to general supply-
demand ratio
Expected Overall Impact
Implementation of Electricity 
Exchange (/Wholesale Prices)
positive or negative
negative
none or negative
positive or negative
negative
arbitrage by price 
transparency
less regulatory capture
capital costs (risk), 
restructuring costs
restructuring costs (low)
allocative efficiency (profit 
target)
capital costs (risk) by 
increased transparency
costs of addidional 
transactions
increased competition
increased competition
control by private owners
Possible Impacts on Retail/Wholesale Price
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period 1994 to 2007. Consequently, panel models are used for estimation. The price data is 
obtained from OLADE, a statistical office gathering data for the South American sub-
continent. Prices are published for different customer segments (residential, commercial, and 
industrial). Real exchange rates instead of power purchasing parities (PPP) are used to 
standardize prices in the respective countries. There is a trade-off in the choice between the 
two standardization approaches: The procurement of a substantial part of inputs (assets) 
underlies world market conditions. Thereby, using PPP exchange rates would give a wrong 
impression of the competitive potential of a market, because prices in low-price countries tend 
to be overestimated and vice versa. By contrast, real exchange rates underestimate the share 
of costs resulting from country-specific (labor-intensive) inputs. To correctly consider this 
difference, one would have to standardize cost shares separately. Given the availability of 
(accounting) information this is rather difficult. Furthermore, considering the various 
customer groups, PPPs seem to be more adequate for customers who cannot move or will not 
because of electricity prices (residential, most commercial, some industrial). However, from 
the perspective of a company, which is free to choose its production site and uses electricity 
as an input, electricity prices in real terms are the appropriate measure of comparison. In view 
of the relevant input factors as well as the (potential) mobility of the considered customer 
groups, the preference is given to price standardizations using real exchange rates.13,14 
The first overview over the data is given by Figure 1. Regarding policy reforms, some of the 
countries qualify as early, some as late adopters, but most show moderate to inclined reform 
activity. Vertical lines represent policy changes and characterize a steady and rather 
sequential reform activity. This makes the South American countries an interesting object for 
this case study. The diagrams retrace the development of residential and industrial customer 
prices, tiresp
,  and tiindp
,  . A convergence of end-use prices across countries can partly be 
observed for industrial prices on the one hand and residential prices on the other.15 While 
comparing residential and industrial customer groups, it can further be stated that average 
residential prices stay on about the same level over the time horizon whereas average 
industrial prices fall. Customer prices will be explained in the regression model by policy and 
control variables.  
 
                                                            
13 For a deeper discussion of this topic, see for example overviews by Rogoff (1996)  and Taylor (2002). For international price 
comparisons dealing with this topic see Ong (1997), Lutz (1999) and Productivity Commission (1999). For a price comparison in the 
telecommunication sector see Charles River Associates (2002). 
14 Exchange rates and different countries’ inflations are obtained from the IMF (2008) database. All currencies are transformed to US$ 
and expressed in year 2000 values. 
15 Cf. Appendix. 
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Sources: OLADE, national legislature/regulator information, IMF16  
Figure 1: Reform history of sample countries; prices in $c/kWh converted using exchange rates 
 
The variables are subdivided in regulatory reform variables of primary interest in this article, 
ti
kr
,  (”reform variables“ for short), controlling reform variables, tily
,  (“reform controls“), and 
other control variables, timz
, . Superscripts i, i =1,…,N, and t, t =1,…,T, denote panel 
organization of the data and stand for the individual country and the year of observation 
respectively. Vector elements tikr
,  comprise the two principal policy variables ownership 
unbundling ( tiou , ) and third party access ( titpa , ), ( )tititi tpaour ,,, ,= . Third party access 
usually comes along with some form of unbundling. So, the third party access variable can 
also be seen as a variable including all remaining softer forms of unbundling except 
ownership unbundling. Reform controls ( tily
, ) are privatization ( tipriv , ), the introduction of 
electricity exchanges ( tiiee , ) and independent regulatory agencies ( tiira , ), 
( )titititi iraieeprivy ,,,, ,,= .17 Except for privatization, all of these variables are dichotomous. 
Privatization is a compound variable of separate dummies for generation, transportation and 
distribution infrastructure as well as supply level privatization, with all supply chain levels 
entering at equal weight and the result normed to unity. Reforms in our data take place at the 
date of legislative enforcement, meaning formal implementation, with the exception of 
                                                            
16 Cf. OLADE (2012), ARIAE (2012). Information is obtained from OLADE and regulators’ web-sites. 
17 Liberalization and end price regulation as two other very important reform variables were excluded due to insufficient variation in the 
observation period. Industrial customers were mostly liberalized, whereas residential customers remained mostly in not-opened markets. The 
same accounts for regulation of end prices. 
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electricity exchanges because the dates of actual implementation are easily verifiable. For all 
of the former variables, some observation error due to unobserved heterogeneity is inevitable. 
For example, effective implementation can be delayed as compared to formal implementation. 
Also, it is difficult to trace the date of actual implementation as processes are often highly 
structured (with sometimes strong effects resulting from small steps) and some arbitrary 
judgement may occasionally be needed to define whether a certain degree corresponds to full 
implementation. Hence, incorporated judgement and classification in the construction of 
regulation variables will necessarily lead to a certain error given the specificity of and 
heterogeneity among countries. Further, sources of unobserved heterogeneity problems may 
stem from varying conditions in the economic environment. For example, the effects of the 
introduction of unbundling will strongly depend on the production structure at that time. A 
monopolistic or tight market may need much longer before profiting from an unbundled 
regime than a market with a fragmented structure. The use of variables accounting for all such 
eventualities is fairly impossible against the background of data restrictions. Also an omitted 
variables problem may be relevant. This might lead to the usual inconsistency and a bias of 
coefficient estimates. An example is an idiosyncratic and invariable production structure 
correlated with some regulation path. For example, the potential of countries to build cheap 
water power plants is restricted by environmental conditions. These factors are taken into 
account by the fixed-effects model with country and time specific fixed effects.18 Country-
specificities are, for example, the production structure or different quality of service levels. 
The full set of time dummies instead of a trend variable is used to account for macroeconomic 
shocks and special common influences to all countries, for example technological change. In 
addition to these fixed effects, the gross domestic product is used as a control variable. 
Hausman tests also strongly indicate the use of country-specific dummies.19 Control variables 
ti
mz
,  therefore include individual dummies ( ti,α ), time dummies ( td ) and the gross domestic 
product per capita (gdppc), ( )tittiti gdppcdz ,,, ,,α= . 
4 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
Static and dynamic impacts of reforms 
 
The main contribution of this article is contrasting static and dynamic impacts of reforms. 
Accordingly, both static and dynamic regression models are applied. 
The naïve static regression model in this article takes the following form. 
∑ ∑∑
≤≤ ≤≤≤≤
++++=
21
,
31
,
31
,,
0
,
k
ti
m
ti
mm
l
ti
ll
ti
kk
ti
cust zyrp εδγββ ,     (1) 
For the left hand side variable ticustp
,  both industrial and residential customer prices (net of the 
                                                            
18 This model specification is given preference over the use of generation shares as explanatory variables as done by Steiner (2000) and 
Hattori and Tsutsui (2004). Against the background of high water proportions in generation and heterogeneous levels across countries, 
additional variables for example considering stronger weather influences on prices would have to be included. To correctly model price 
formation processes, further factors and endogenous decision processes would have to be included. As this would lead to substantial 
complications and incur data restrictions, fixed country effects are retained here as they may cause less distortion than solely modelling 
shares of water generation capacity. This could be a direction for future research. 
19 The results of this and the following tests of model specification can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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state induced price share) are used to contrast results of different variable and model 
specifications used in prior research with results of dynamic analysis by lagged models.20 
Models found in prior research mostly include formulations in level equations and logarithmic 
price transformations. The latter are often used to deal with multicollinearity problems. I 
further compare a model formulation in first-differences to cope with multicollinearity in the 
static regression framework. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) usually exceed the critical 
value of 10. A further indication for this problem and especially for serial correlation 
problems is that Durbin-Watson statistics are significant and Breusch-Pagan-tests show very 
high significance. Therefore, a first step consists in estimating the static models using the 
Baltagi and Wu transform of the original data that removes the AR(1) component. This 
transformation builds on ρ , the correlation coefficient from the formula specifying the error 
component assumption tititi ,1,, υρεε += −  with ti,υ  i.i.d. and ),0( 2υσN . In a second step 
further transformations are implemented with the intention of completely removing 
multicollinearity problems. One usual way to cope with this problem is using the logarithmic 
transformations of prices and estimating a semi-log model. Though this is quite common, it is 
implicitly assumed that the different levels of the value chain are multiplicatively composed. 
This is obviously not true for additive costs for example in the case of electricity production, 
considering the sum of generation, transportation, distribution and retail cost. The 
specification using first differences is implemented as a more appropriate option to control for 
detrimental effects of multicollinearity.21 Durbin-Watson statistics indicate no problems with 
autocorrelation and VIFs fall significantly below a level of 10.22 
The corresponding static models for the semi-log and the first-difference specifications are 
∑ ∑∑
≤≤ ≤≤≤≤
++++=
21
,
31
,
31
,,
0
,ln
k
ti
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mm
l
ti
ll
ti
kk
ti
cust zyrp εδγββ      (2) 
and 
∑ ∑∑
≤≤ ≤≤≤≤
+∆+∆+∆+=∆
21
,
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l
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ti
kk
ti
cust zyrp εδγββ .    (3) 
In the second model, the number of further control variables z decreases as country-specific 
effects vanish due to differencing. The degrees of freedom of the estimation do not change 
due to this transformation, because one year of observation is lost (N country variables), but 
country effects vanish (N country variables). 
Taking into account dynamic effects, the static regression model in differences is extended to 
a distributed lag model complementing the regression equation for two lags in reform 
variables.23,24  
 
ti
m
ti
mm
l
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kk
ti
cust zyrp
,
21
,
31 31
1,
21 31
1,
0
, εδγββ
θ
θθ
θ
θθ ∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆ ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑
≤≤≤≤ ≤≤
+−
≤≤ ≤≤
+−   (4) 
Apart from serial correlation in error terms, common panel unit root tests proposed by Levin, 
Lin and Chu (2002) (LLC) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS) indicate problems with 
                                                            
20 Cf. Steiner (2000), Hattori and Tsutsui (2004), Nagayama (2009), or Erdogdu (2011). 
21 Cf. Cameron and Trivedi (2005). 
22 Specifications without AR(1)-term and using White’s robust variance-covariance matrices correcting for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation yield similar significance results.  
23 Including further lags did not lead to significance of longer lags implying dynamic completeness (cf. Wooldridge (2010)). 
24 Distributed lag models are estimated using White’s heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrices (cf. Wooldridge (2010)). 
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integration (cf. Table 3). Model (4) modified to incorporate differenced endogenous lagged 
dependent variables then takes the following form. The lagged endogenous variable enters up 
to limit Θ . 
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        (5)25 
The LLC then tests the null hypothesis that individual coefficients θβ ,ipcust  are identical and 
smaller one for all individuals ( 1...: ,,10 <===
θθθ βββ
custcustcust p
N
ppH ). This is similar to the usual 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test. The IPS in contrast averages single tests (
1,...,1: ,,10 <<
θθ ββ Npp custcustH ). The underlying implicit hypothesis is that an autoregressive 
influence might distort estimation results. This is the case when prices partially move 
independently of observed fundamental changes and remain on similar levels as in the 
preceding period due to some inertia. Model specifications in section 5 differ with respect to 
limit Θ , which is determined dependent on autoregression statistics. 
Equations (4) and (5), more generally depict an important difference compared to previous 
studies. The dynamic analysis makes possible flaws of these studies transparent, which solely 
consider static, simultaneous impacts of reforms. 
The basic estimation technique of equation (5) including lagged dependent variables goes 
back to Anderson and Hsiao (1981). The authors propose to take first differences to avoid 
serial correlation of fixed effects iα  with the error term iε  and then to use first lags of 
occurring endogenous variables, for example lagged dependent variables, as instruments to 
avoid correlation of the remaining regressors with the error term as well.26 Despite using 
endogenous dependent variables consistent estimates of coefficients can be obtained. 
Endogeneity problems arise because 2,1,1, −−− −=∆ tititi ppp  is correlated with the following 
period’s error term 1,,, −−=∆ tititi εεε . 1, −tip  as well as 1, −tiε  are both contained in the 
regression equation, which leads to inconsistent coefficient estimates as 0][ 1,1, ≠−− titipE ε . 
Instrumenting 1, −tip  by 2, −tip  will circumvent this problem as 0][ 1,2, =−− titipE ε . Also, weak 
exogeneity of regressors θ−∆ tikr
, , θ−∆ tily
,  (k=1,2; l=1,…,3; θ =0,1,2) and tiz ,∆  is assumed, 
which already derives from the fact that the regressors are merely crude categorical variables. 
Thereby, additional moment conditions of the form 
and,0][,0][ ,,,, =∆∆=∆∆ −− tisil
tisi
k yErE εε
θθ  ,,...,1,,0][ ,, TttszE tisi =≤=∆∆ ε  can be 
imposed for (k=1,2; l=1,…,3; θ =0,1,2). Based on these additional moment conditions, the 
instrumental variable panel GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is used, 
                                                            
25 Equations (1) and (2) are well-defined for i=1,…,N and t=1,…,T, whereas (3) is well-defined for t=2,…,T. (4) and (5) are well-defined 
for t=4,…,T. 
26 This is also known as pre-determination of variables. Cf. Wooldridge (2010). 
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which includes additional lags of the instruments increasing the efficiency of estimation.27 
Regressors θ−∆ tikr
, , θ−∆ tily
,  (k=1,2; l=1,…,3; θ =0,1,2) and tiz ,∆  remain in the regression as 
well. 
As over-identification of the model might become a problem, the inclusion of instruments has 
been tested by the usual Sargan test. Results indicate no over-identification problem.  
In three subsets of regressions, industrial, residential prices and the difference between 
residential and industrial prices are taken as dependent variables. The results of the industrial 
customer group shall be mirrored against the ones of the residential customer group to see 
whether both groups are equally affected by reforms. The price difference is used to examine 
whether redistribution takes place as a consequence of single reforms.  
 
Selection Bias 
 
A particular problem in the context of this analysis is the potential selection bias. For 
example, Nagayama (2009) found partially strong dependence of the choice of the regulatory 
model on recent price changes and thus identified possible selection problems. If some kind of 
pre-selection process systematically influences reform success, estimation results of equations 
(1) to (5) might be distorted. To assess the relevance of the endogeneity problem of reform 
probability and electricity prices a bivariate sample selection model is estimated.28 A selection 
bias is conjectured to exist regarding reform success measured by the impact of the reform on 
electricity prices. Due to a possible correlation between the success of reform activity and the 
motivation to conduct a reform based on, for example, the quality of the reformer, the 
observed reform impacts might be biased. A good reformer might be more inclined to reform 
and then have greater success, or, the other way round, a bad reformer might suffer more 
political pressure and end up with less success in the reform’s execution.29 
Similar to Zhang et al. (2008), prices might serve as a proxy for the quality of the reformer. 
They assume lower prices prior to the reform to serve as a signal for a more efficient regulator 
being interested in low prices already before the reform and therefore being more active and 
more successful in the reform activity of interest.30 She can, for example, engage in additional 
measures like structural interventions in new built decisions or permission of cost coverage or 
subsidization. In contrast, price levels might exhibit a certain pressure on regulators to 
undertake reforms. Such an unsuccessful regulator, who is not interested in low prices, might 
be reluctant and less successful in her reform activity. Of course, the argumentation may be 
reversed, when the continuity assumption of the regulator is abandoned. A replacement of the 
inefficient by a more efficient regulator in the high price scenario might as well lead to high 
reform impacts, whereas an efficient regulator in the low price scenario might feel less 
pressure to engage in the reform activity. Reforms, however, could thus have systematically 
different impacts depending on the sample investigated.  
Therefore the decision to undertake the reform measure is assumed to depend on the average 
                                                            
27 This is also known as stacking of instruments. Cf. Cameron and Trivedi (2005). 
28 Cf. section 2.1. 
29 For the following description of the methodology of sample selection models cf. Cameron and Trivedi (2005) or Wooldridge (2010). 
30 Of course, one might argue the opposite way. High prices prior to the reform could serve as a signal for a less efficient regulator, but 
could leave room for higher cost savings after the reform and despite the regulator’s quality. 
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price level before the reform in year R, the first variable ( ) ( )∑=<
=
R
t
i
custR
i
cust tpRtp
1
1 . First, the 
hypothesis is proposed that lower prices ( )Rtpicust <  induce inclined reform activity with 
potentially greater subsequent reform success. As a consequence, for prices being below some 
individual limit value i
L
ii
ixL εξ +=  in a random draw, a distortion of equations (1) to (5) 
might occur. ix  contains unobservable characteristics describing the regulator’s utility 
function, ξ  is its  
coefficient and iLiε  the error term. For a random draw, the inequality 
( ) iLiiicust iLRtp εεζ +<+<  then describes the condition for reform activity. Or, from a 
different angle, the lower the price limit, the lower the regulator’s motivation for regulation 
activities and subsequent success should be.31 Simple transformation leads to 
( ) 0<+−< iiicust vLRtp ζ  with iv  denoting the composed error term 
i
L
i
iεε − .  
We cannot measure the success of a reform ikr , which is described by induced 
ti
custp
,∆ , if the 
reform has not been undertaken until to date. As we do not know iL  we cannot use the 
observed ( )Rtpicust <  directly to check for a selection bias. For example, if iL  were observed 
and exogenous and ( )Rtpicust <  were always observed, a censored regression framework 
would be the appropriate one. Alternatively, if iL  were observed and exogenous and 
( )Rtpicust <  were observed when reform activity is observed, we would find ourselves in a 
truncated regression framework. But, as iL  is not observable the selection regression 
framework is appropriate. 
In summary, for ( )Rtpicust <  being under a certain individual, country-specific price limit iL , 
a good regulator will be more inclined to unbundle or grant third party access, or also to 
introduce a wholesale market, representing the main variables of interest in this analysis.32 
The selection equation is then represented by the indicator function for reform activity 
( )[ ]01 <+−<= iiicustik vLRtpr ζ . To test the alternative hypothesis of a low quality regulator, 
( )Rtpicust <  is assumed to be strictly above limit iL . 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )



≤<≥<
><<<
=
.0
,,1
ii
cust
ii
cust
ii
cust
ii
custi
k
LRtpifLRtpif
LRtpifelyalternativorLRtpif
r  (6) 
Probit or logit estimation enables to ascertain the probability ( )ζicustpΦ  of stepping forward 
to reform activity given a certain price level. Then, if reform activity is chosen ( 1=ikr ), a 
price effect is determined dependent on the success of the reform, which might be dependent 
on the quality of the regulator. 
The following two equations describe the model in which errors ti,ε  might be correlated with 
                                                            
31 Cf. Wooldridge (2010), p. 560. 
32 The emphasis on wholesale markets is justified by the fact that desired effects of increased competition may be induced by (additional) 
transparency, thereby increasing allocation efficiency. 
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the errors of the selection model in equation (6), iv . A correlation of this form, i.e. 
vvE ρε =)|( , would distort the general model by the inverse Mill’s ratio, the correction for 
the conditional expected value ( ) ( )( )
( )( )ζ
ζφζ
Rtp
RtpRtpvvE i
cust
i
custi
cust
ii
<Φ
<
=<−> )|( . By the law 
of iterated expectations this results in a necessary adaptation of regression equation (5). 
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 (7) 
for k=1,2,3 for the ownership unbundling reform, third party access reforms, and the 
introduction of wholesale markets respectively. kζˆ  are the estimates of the first stage 
regression. For the three different reforms we thus potentially have three inverse Mill’s ratios. 
The additional distorting effect on price changes caused by reforms, which is attributable to 
price levels, or (in other words) regulator’s quality, is then given by 

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=∆
=∆
.0
,1*,,
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k
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ti
custti
cust rif
rifp
p          (8) 
In the case that 0=ikr  no meaningful interpretation of 
ti
custp
,∆  is possible with regard to reform 
probability dependent on price levels. *,ticustp∆  denotes the latent variable measuring reform 
success if it were observable throughout. 
An alternative model formulation is investigated if the reform has already been undertaken at 
the beginning of the inspection period. I refer to this case as case (b). The case described 
beforehand – taking means before a reform takes place – is referred to as case (a). icustp  then 
denotes the mean over the whole period T, ( )∑=
=
T
t
i
custT
i
cust tpp
1
1 .33 The selection equation is 
then represented by [ ]01, >+−= iiicusti bk vLpr ζ  for case (b).34 ( )Rtpicust <  from case (a) is 
then analogously replaced by icustp  in subsequent equations and inequalities (6) to (8). In 
total six inverse Mill’s ratios are calculated and the corresponding coefficients kρ  of equation 
(7) are obtained. 
As Table 2 shows, estimation of the whole model (7) suggests insignificance of sample 
selection problems. The coefficients kρ  of the inverse Mill’s ratios are insignificant 
throughout. A distortion of the coefficients of interest kβ  is therefore unlikely and consistent 
estimates can be obtained. Results for ownership unbundling, third party access and the 
introduction of a wholesale market are depicted. Remaining results of the whole regression 
are contained in Table 4. 
                                                            
33 This is assumed to be reasonable, because the variables of primary interest are price changes and lagged price changes and not the new 
price levels after the reform. 
34 ζ  and iv  in case a differs from ζ  and iv  in case b. 
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Table 2: Estimation results for Inverse Mill’s Ratios of equation (7) 
  
The fact that none of the results is significant complements the results of Nagayama (2009).35 
Nagayama estimates the relevance of last period’s price changes in contrast to price levels and 
thus focuses solely on the very short term dynamics. The author neither found evidence for 
first differences of the preceding period’s price to influence regulatory decisions or even their 
success. This suggests that the analysis is not subjected to sample selection problems.36,37 
Therefore, equations (1) to (5) can be used for estimation. 
5 RESULTS 
The dataset on South America described in section 3 is now used to evaluate ownership 
unbundling and third party access reforms. First, static regression results are discussed. 
Second, the Arellano-Bond estimation framework is used in the dynamic distributed lag 
context demonstrating the dynamic characteristics of electricity reforms.  
The following table contains the results of the static estimation models used, which are similar 
to the typical models presented in the literature (cf. footnote 17). I compare three different 
models for industrial and residential customers, respectively, in an AR(1)-specification. 
Models (1) and (4) in Table 3 are estimated in levels, (2) and (5) in logs and (3) and (6) in 
first differences (FD). To exploit maximum efficiency in estimation, after estimating the full 
model, insignificant variables are dropped from the regression except variables of primary 
interest, ownership unbundling and third party access.38 ‘f’s and ‘r’s then denote full and 
reduced models. As mentioned above, the level estimation suffers from multicollinearity 
problems whereas the log-specification assumes an incorrectly specified production function. 
Despite their flaws these specifications have regularly been used in previous analyses and 
shall therefore serve as a benchmark despite their weaknesses. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
35 The results of the residential customers’ inverse Mill’s ratios for the third party access and the wholesale dummy variable differ in the 
fourth digit. 
36 Cf. Wooldridge (2010), p.805ss. 
37 The variation in the data for third party access as the third central reform of interest in this article is too restricted to perform a 
meaningful analysis, as all countries except Paraguay took this reform step. Inspection of the data though reveals that similar results are to be 
expected. 
38 Variables are eliminated sequentially beginning with variables of lowest significance. Therefore variables being insignificant in the full 
sample regression can become significant during the elimination process. 
Δp res,i -0.179 (-) 0.102 (-) -0.103 (-) -0.103 (-) * 0,90 sign. level
Δp ind,i (-) -0.300 (-) -0.004 (-) (-) (-) 0.050 ** 0,95 sign. level
Adj. R-squared 0.52 0.38 0.35 0.25 0.35 (-) 0.35 0.25 *** 0,99 sign. level
P(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (-) 0.00 0.00
Inverse Mill's Ratios
Residential Industrial Residential Industrial Residential Industrial
(a) (b)
whsd i ou i tpa i whsd i
Residential Industrial
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Table 3: Regression estimates – static analysis (equs. (1) to (3)) 
 
 
Ownership unbundling is found to have a positive influence on customer prices throughout 
the different models. Especially the unreliable regressions in levels show significantly 
positive parameters. By contrast influence of ownership unbundling is only significant for 
residential customers in the FD-model, while the other variables are insignificant. 
 
In contrast, the dynamic distributed lag model reveals the dynamic nature of reforms 
(presented in Table 4). Analogously to the static regressions a reduced version of the model 
without insignificant variables is estimated.39 
To identify optimal lag lengths of the endogenous variables LLC- and IPS Tests are applied 
(cf. Table 3). Therefore, two models with different lag lengths are estimated for each 
dependent variable, whose lag lengths depend on the results of the respective tests. Using the 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test statistic it is checked for correct model specification with 
respect to autocorrelation. Significant values are below .1 or .05 (cf. lower third of Table 4). 
Therefore validity of the first-lag industrial price and both price difference model might be 
restricted, which is indicated by the second and third order statistics.40 The results, however, 
are assumed to still be admissible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
39 Country-specific effects are not reported, because they are not the primary concern of this analysis. It should be noted that they are 
significant at the 1% level. 
40 In both models, Durbin-Watson tests indicate that the AR-problem has vanished. Inclusion of further lags did not lead to a better model 
fit. 
indep. variables
C 4.74 *** 3.69 *** 1.82 *** 1.88 *** -0.03 -0.18 8.47 *** 5.92 *** 2.59 *** 1.85 *** 0.66 0.16
ou t 1.27 1.63 * 0.03 0.09 0.66 1.00 2.10 ** 2.31 *** 0.16 -0.16 2.13 ** 2.14 **
tpa t 0.10 0.39 0.08 0.10 -0.79 -0.85 1.14 0.85 0.10 0.05 0.88 0.46
priv t 0.17 0.02 0.48 -0.33 -0.03 -0.23
iee t 0.85 0.17 0.44 -0.26 -0.06 0.02
ira t -0.40 -0.10 -0.50 -0.94 -0.25 -0.76
gdppc t 0.00 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.19 0.11 0.37 0.13 0.21 0.08 0.43 0.14
LLC (#lags) 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1
IPS (#lags) 1 1 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 2 2 2
p ind  - industrial prices ou - ownership unbundling priv - privatisation ira - indep.reg.authority * .90, ** .95,*** .99 sign.lvl.
p res  - residential prices tpa - third party access iee - introd.of.elec.exchange gdppc - GDP per capita
(1r)          
AR-level,     
red. mod.
(2f)              
AR-log,         
full mod.
(2r)              
AR-log,        
red. mod.
(3f)              
AR-FD,       
full mod.
(3r)              
AR-FD,      
red. mod.
dep. variable p ind,t
(1f)       
AR-level,     
full mod.
p res,t
(4f)       
AR-level, 
full mod.
(4r)        
AR-level, 
red. mod.
(5f)       
AR-log, 
full mod.
(5r)      
AR-log, 
red. mod.
(6f)      
AR-FD, 
full mod.
(6r)      
AR-FD, 
red. mod.
18 
 
Table 4: Regression estimates – dynamic analysis (eq. (5))  
  
 
Regarding lagged prices, most models show a clear significance of the first lag. The size of 
the coefficient ranges between .26 and .42 for significant values, which indicates a modest 
dependence on past prices. For industrial prices there is an additional counter-effect in the 
third lag. Against the background of decreasing industrial prices over time this suggests that 
lagged price increases compensate the first lag effects.  
Ownership unbundling and third party access are the central reform variables under scrutiny. 
The focus of the analysis is on industrial prices as competition should take full effect due to 
unregulated customer prices (and, of course, the customers’ option to switch their supplier). In 
particular the dynamics of the impact are remarkable for the two reforms. Ownership 
unbundling leads to an initial price increase, which is slightly significant for the one lag full 
sample model, and then causes prices to decrease. In contrast, third party access has either no 
significant or even a decreasing simultaneous influence, whereas the lagged impact is 
significantly negative in any case. This finding is supported by conjoint Wald-tests of the 
overall effect of ownership unbundling and third party access reforms (cf. lower third of Table 
indep. variables
C 1.77 4.73 *** 4.21 ** 7.79 *** 8.82 *** 6.01 *** 8.93 *** 5.61 *** 6.44 *** 4.53 1.45 0.66
Δp k,t-1 0.32 *** 0.22 0.41 *** 0.42 ** 0.31 *** 0.07 0.33 ** 0.14 0.26 ** 0.27 0.26 ** 0.26 **
Δp k,t-2 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01
Δp k,t-3 -0.02 -0.21 * -0.04 0.02
Δou t 2.33 * 1.26 1.72 1.27 2.82 3.98 2.82 3.91 ** 1.04 ** 0.87 1.76 *** 1.64 ***
Δou t-1 -0.64 0.15 -1.72 -0.30 0.64 0.04 0.62 0.16 0.62 * -0.61 0.19 -0.49
Δou t-2 -2.50 *** -1.48 -2.06 *** -2.51 *** -3.47 *** -3.05 *** -3.42 *** -3.59 *** -0.06 0.01 -0.26 -0.29
Δtpa t -0.16 0.95 -1.46 *** -1.87 -0.45 1.16 -0.42 0.08 -0.05 -0.42 2.58 ** 1.31 **
Δtpa t-1 0.18 0.26 -1.36 *** -1.45 ** -0.54 -0.65 -0.58 0.11 -1.24 0.09 -0.96 -0.47
Δtpa t-2 -2.22 ** -1.56 -2.26 *** -1.49 ** 0.73 ** 0.37 0.76 ** 0.85 2.60 *** 1.48 2.79 *** 2.80 ***
Δpriv t -0.08 -0.41 -0.44 -0.43 -0.80 -0.23
Δpriv t-1 -0.49 ** 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.41 0.27
Δpriv t-2 0.44 0.48 -0.44 -0.45 -0.73 -0.86 ** -0.67 *
Δiee t 4.70 ** 3.83 *** 1.02 0.96 -2.07 -0.72
Δiee t-1 2.32 *** 1.24 *** -1.69 * -1.62 -3.38 *** -4.44 *** -2.77 *** -3.64 ***
Δiee t-2 0.05 2.47 *** 2.76 *** 1.92 *** 1.94 *** 1.65 ** 1.95 -0.64
Δira t 1.49 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.78 0.47
Δira t-1 -1.22 -0.19 -0.83 -0.78 -0.64 -1.16
Δira t-2 -0.99 -0.37 -0.99 -1.05 * -1.06 *** -0.61 -0.47
Δgdppc t 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00 * 0.00 *** 0.00
F-stat. (Wald chi2) 10.52 255.23 138.47 245.39 22.04 307.24 42.65 61.28 37.94 69.52 43.19 497.05
P(F-stat.) 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald ou , chi2(1) 0.44 0.00 2.01 1.61 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.13 2.71 0.14 3.36 2.05
P>chi2 0.51 0.96 0.16 0.20 0.99 0.69 0.99 0.72 0.10 0.71 0.07 0.15
Wald tpa , chi2(1) 2.14 0.18 47.73 7.34 0.05 0.50 0.05 1.43 1.20 0.33 24.26 16.39
P>chi2 0.14 0.67 0.00 0.01 0.82 0.48 0.82 0.23 0.27 0.56 0.00 0.00
AB-AC, ord 1 (P-st.) 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.63 0.02 0.41 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
ord 2 0.16 0.13 0.25 0.82 0.29 0.94 0.44 0.75 0.66 0.57 0.17 0.79
ord 3 0.12 0.09 0.23 0.92 0.46 0.98 0.54 0.95 0.78 0.17 0.10 0.24
p ind  - industrial prices    ou - ownership unbundling priv - privatisation ira - indep.reg.authority * .90, ** .95,*** .99 sign.lvl.
p res  - residential prices    tpa - third party access iee - introd.of.elec.exchange gdppc - GDP per capita
p diff  - difference 'residential
   -industrial' prices
Δp ind, t
(1f) full       
model
(1r) red. 
model
1 lag 3 lags
(5f) full 
model
(5r) red. 
model
Δp res, t
1 lag 2 lags
(3f) full 
model
(3r) red. 
model
(6f) full 
model
(6r) red. 
model
(2f) full 
model
(2r) red. 
model
dep. variables (k )
(4f) full 
model
(4r) red. 
model
Δp diff, t
1 lag 3 lags
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4). The more reliable three lag models show strongly significant results for third party access. 
In contrast, the overall effect of ownership unbundling appears to be neutral for industrial 
customers’ prices. These results are economically sensible: Ownership unbundling comes 
along with high costs in restructuring periods, whereas third party access would avoid the 
costs of unbundling but is expected to have a similar potential of cost reduction if tight 
supervision is exerted by a regulatory authority. This suggests that ownership unbundling has 
no significant net effect in the long run when dynamic specifications are used.41 
With regard to control variables, only the introduction of an electricity exchange is found to 
have a clear impact on prices. It is positive throughout, though its scale is surprising. This is 
mainly attributable to Brazil and Columbia, who suffered large price increases after the 
introduction of their electricity exchanges. A possible explanation for this observation could 
be that formerly administered prices based on historical costs of mainly older (depreciated) 
generation plants tend to be lower than forward looking prices found in uniform price 
auctions. The latter typically mostly follow full replacement costs of the marginal power 
plant. In such a market based organization, depreciated plants may then earn high revenues of 
the recently installed marginal plant increasing total cost of energy production. This is the 
flipside of transparency: It reveals a previous overshooting as well as a previous shortfall in 
cost coverage.42 Privatization is the only other significant control. It has a moderate negative 
impact that is in line with theoretical considerations. 
For residential customers autocorrelation already vanishes for the two lag dynamic model. 
Coefficients of lagged dependent variables are of similar size. Regarding ownership 
unbundling a comparable effect as the one found for industrial customers is estimated:43 
Initially increasing prices are offset by decreasing prices in the second lags, so that the overall 
effect is neutral as Wald-tests show. Interestingly, third party access neither has a systematic 
overall influence, though there is some evidence for the full sample models that it increases 
prices in the second lag, which are significant at the .95 level. The explanation for this could 
be that competition in the residential customer segment is usually less intense than in the 
industrial segment, so that reforms may represent an occasion for a reallocation of (overhead) 
costs and a redistribution of welfare from less competitive residential to industrial customers. 
Moreover, the residential customer segment often remains temporarily or permanently 
protected during liberalization processes.  In South America, liberalization notably did not 
take place on residential markets during the period of observation and customer price 
regulation was upheld. Especially the latter exhibits a great influence on retail prices which 
should not be ignored when interpreting the results. With regard to third party access, the 
resulting neutrality is therefore plausible. Furthermore, the effects found for ownership 
unbundling for residential customers lead to the question whether they are a consequence of 
discretionary regulatory rebalancing of relative prices or effects based on increased market 
orientation. To answer this question it would be necessary to separate impacts on potentially 
competitive generation and regulated network (and retail) levels. But the data basis of this 
analysis does not allow further subdivision of the sample.44 
                                                            
41 Similar, and even clearer, results were obtained by the analysis in the simple distributed lag model, without lagged prices as explanatory 
variables. However, LLC- and IPS-results indicate that these results are distorted. 
42 The coefficients for the introduction of an electricity exchange are comparably high. This might be due to the inclusion of stacked 
instruments. Therefore, interpretation of the scale of coefficients should be of secondary importance. The same, of course, holds for the other 
variables. 
43 However, price changes take place on a higher price level. 
44 Observations would be reduced to 54 points, which is not considered reliable. 
20 
 
The reform controls show that the introduction of an electricity exchange significantly raises 
residential customer prices as well, whereas the independent regulatory authority decreases 
prices in a range of about 1 $-cent.  
The four columns on the right side of Table 4 contain the estimation results on residential-
industrial price differences. Ownership unbundling apparently leads to the unexpected result 
of favoring industrial customers in the year of reform. In contrast, previous overall separate 
estimation results on unbundling of industrial and residential prices (left hand side of Table 4) 
rather indicate a total effect close to zero for both groups. Taking a look at the overall Wald-
test then shows that this zero impact hypothesis of separate estimations actually cannot be 
rejected in case of the price difference estimation. Residential customer prices experience a 
relatively more meaningful price increase in years of reform, which then ceases again in 
following periods. Third party access leads to greater gains for industrial customers. Whereas 
both groups profit approximately equally in the years of and after the reform, industrial 
customers leave residential customers behind in the second year after the introduction of third 
party access. The model specification including three lags of the dependent variable even 
finds redistribution in favor of industrial customer in the year of the reform. In contrast, both 
privatization and the introduction of an electricity exchange induce a closing of the gap 
between residential and industrial prices. The primary goals of these reforms are to increase 
managerial incentives and market transparency. Therefore, both should lead to increased cost 
orientation as well as converging residential and industrial price levels. The independence of 
the regulatory authority seems to play no role regarding the re-adjustment of prices. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this article the impact of regulation reforms in energy markets is examined. In contrast to 
former research the focus is on dynamic effects of the reforms. It is shown that former 
research might have incorrectly estimated impacts of reforms by solely considering static 
models for estimation. With respect to the evaluation of reforms, judgment may be even 
reversed in some cases due to omitted variable biases. Ownership unbundling and third party 
access, the two central reforms under scrutiny, serve as a perfect example for this bias. 
Whereas the former turns out to be irrelevant in the dynamic model, unlike its price increasing 
effect in the static model, the latter would be judged more positively and should therefore be 
regarded as a beneficial policy measure. Thus, an important lesson to learn from this analysis 
is that restructuring takes time as it involves costs before anticipated goals may be achieved. 
The major conclusion to be drawn is the preference of third party access over ownership 
unbundling. Price increases at the introduction stage of ownership unbundling approximately 
outweigh price decreases resulting from falling prices in the aftermath. The lagged dynamic 
impacts of both reforms are positive. In terms of overall beneficial impacts, third party access 
regimes, however, are superior to ownership unbundling. While both reform types have 
similar positive effects, possibly costs of implementation are much higher for ownership 
unbundling. This means that a strict regulatory monitoring combined with a non-
discriminating third party access seems to be sufficient to achieve a significantly negative 
impact on end user prices. Restructuring ownership provides no extra benefit. 
An additional finding is that industrial prices have been much more positively affected by 
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reforms than residential prices. Somewhat surprising is the tendency of increasing residential 
prices during the observation period.45 Various reasons may be invoked for this. For example, 
the price regulation process could have been influenced by regulatory capture or market 
power could have been used to raise residential prices as customers in this segment are not 
able to switch. This could lead to a cross-subsidization of industrial customers. A more 
market oriented interpretation could be that former subsidies to residential customers have 
been mitigated. Also, increased competition for industrial customers is probable to have led to 
some sort of reallocation of costs. As a result, however, a certain redistribution of welfare 
from residential to industrial customers has been taking place. It seems that this process has 
been supported by governments due to the upheld residential customer price regulation during 
the inspection period. An additional explanation could be that in many countries 
electrification – in particular in the residential segment – has increased vastly during the 
observation period. Installation of new lines and cables on average costs more than operation 
with relatively old assets, which might have influenced residential customer prices. In 
addition, of course, as this customer segment increases in importance, it becomes more 
lucrative and less easy to subsidize. 
However, validity of the results is limited due to the small data set employed. This problem is 
attributable to the difficulties associated with the isolation of reform impacts when it comes to 
finding suitable countries, which introduced reforms step by step. Nevertheless, the analysis 
shows that dynamic effects should not be neglected as they possibly contradict findings from 
static analyses. 
Many extensions of the model framework used are possible. From a more detailed modeling 
of cost structures and pricing to a further analysis of impacts resulting from an abolishment of 
end user price regulation there is a wide scope of research. Furthermore, no hypotheses on 
firm behavior are incorporated in the analysis. This would more explicitly demonstrate 
possibly competitive or collusive firm behavior.  
                                                            
45 It should be noted that average industrial prices fall from a level higher than residential prices. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 2: Industrial prices in $c_2000, corrected for inflation prior to exchange rate transformation 
 
Figure 3: Residential prices in $c_2000, corrected for inflation prior to exchange rate transformation 
 
Figure 4: Average residential and industrial prices in $c_2000, corrected for inflation prior to exchange rate 
transformation 
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